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Comment
DOES ECONOMIC CRIME PAY IN PENNSYLVANIA? THE
PERCEPTION OF LENIENCY IN PENNSYLVANIA
ECONOMIC OFFENDER SENTENCING
I. INTRODUCTION
Crime pays-at least for Debra King it did.1 She worked as an ac-
counts payable clerk for Lansdale Manufacturing Company, and over a
two-month period she embezzled over $280,000 from her employer.2 Her
punishment: a night in jail, intermediate punishment for twenty-three
months, the first nine of which she was to spend under house arrest, then
five years of probation. 3 Her sentence also requires that she pay restitu-
1. See Notes of Testimony at 7, Commonwealth v. King, No. 5379-98 (Pa. Ct.
Common Pleas 1999) (July 13, 1999) (imposing intermediate punishment, house
arrest, five years probation and court costs for misappropriation of over $280,000
from Lansdale Manufacturing Co.); see also Interview with Laurel F. Grass, Chief,
Economic Crimes Unit, Montgomery County District Attorney's Office, in Norris-
town, Pa. (June 7, 1999) (commenting generally on leniency of economic crime
offender sentencing, and that all things considered, for these defendants "crime
pays").
2. See Affidavit of Probable Cause at 1-3, Commonwealth v. King, No. 5379-98
(Pa. Ct. Common Pleas 1999) (statement of Det. Sgt. Steven Ford, Upper Gwynedd
Township Police Department detailing nature of employment and offenses attrib-
uted to Debra King). Debra King worked as an accounts payable clerk for Lans-
dale Manufacturing Company in Montgomeryville, Pennsylvania. See id. at 1
(noting King's employment). She worked initially as a temporary employee, start-
ing on March 17, 1997, and then was hired permanently on May 5, 1997. See id.
Between July 9, 1997 and September 4, 1997, someone other than the intended
payee endorsed and transacted a total of 19 checks made payable to various ven-
dors. See id. The various vendors never received the checks, totaling $282,691.33.
Instead, the checks were deposited in a Core States bank account held by Debra
King. See id.
3. See Notes of Testimony at 7-8, King, No. 5379-98 (July 13, 1999) (imposing
sentence). Judge Corso "sentenced" Debra King to one night in jail by simply
adjourning the sentencing hearing until the next day, revoking bail and remand-
ing her to the custody of the sheriff. See Notes of Testimony at 25, King, No. 5379-
98 (July 12, 1999) (adjourning sentencing for one day). The purpose of the ad-
journment was to provide Debra King with a taste of what jail is like and to let her
know that "if [she does not] make a one hundred percent turnaround in [her]
conduct" she would be back. Notes of Testimony at 5, King, No. 5379-98 (July 13,
1999). "Intermediate punishment" is defined as "[a] sentencing alternative availa-
ble to the court for eligible offenders who would otherwise be sentenced to partial
or total confinement in a county correctional facility." PENNSYLVANIA SENTENCING
GUIDELINES IMPLEMENTATION MANUAL 270 (1997) [hereinafter PA SENTENCING
GUIDELINES] (defining intermediate punishment). For a further discussion of in-
termediate punishment, see infra notes 139-41 and accompanying text. Debra
King was already receiving rehabilitative therapy from the Penn Foundation at the
time of sentencing. See Notes of Testimony at 14-15, King, No. 5379-98 (July 12,
(793)
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tion to her former employer; barring any unforeseen circumstances, how-
ever, the single mother will likely never repay the entire amount to
Lansdale Manufacturing Company.4 Typically, some payments are made
at first, then they just stop.5
Another example is Linda DeSimone.6 Ms. DeSimone owned and op-
erated a bill collection service known as Quantum Recovery Organization
("Quantum"). 7 Among DeSimone's clients was Volunteer Medical Ser-
vices Corporation ("VMSC"), which contracted with Quantum for bill col-
lection services. 8 VMSC billed over $21,000 for services rendered to
1999) (noting that King was already receiving rehabilitative therapy). Judge Corso
required as part of King's sentence that she continue this therapy. See Notes of
Testimony at 8, King, No. 5379-98 (July 13, 1999) (mandating continuation of ther-
apy as requirement of sentence). The sentence that Judge Corso imposed on
Debra King-one night in jail, intermediate punishment for twenty-three months,
the first nine of which were to be spent under house arrest, then five years of
probation, and restitution-was considerably more lenient than the sentence rec-
ommended by the Pennsylvania Sentencing Guidelines ("Pennsylvania Guide-
lines") for Theft by Deception, which is nine to sixteen months confinement. See
PA SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 2, at 33 (providing grid for sentencing); 18
PA. CONS. STAT. § 3922 (1998) (describing crime of "theft by deception"). For a
discussion on the use of the Pennsylvania Guidelines, see infra notes 130-46 and
accompanying text.
4. See Notes of Testimony at 8, King, No. 5379-98 (July 13, 1999) (outlining
restitution payment plan). Debra King's restitution plan required that she pay "fif-
teen thousand dollars ... forthwith" and "one thousand dollars per month" from
rental property directly to Lansdale Manufacturing Company. See id. Additionally,
Judge Corso required King to pay "not less than three hundred dollars per month"
restitution. See id. (outlining restitution payments to be made). Ms. King was also
required to continue full-time employment. See id. (outlining special conditions of
release). At the time of sentencing, Debra King was working as a receptionist
through a temporary employment agency. See Notes of Testimony at 13, King, No.
5379-98 (July 12, 1999) (detailing current job status). Counsel for Lansdale Manu-
facturing Company testified at the sentencing hearing on behalf of Debra King
that it would be in the best interest of the company that Debra King not be sen-
tenced to incarceration, but rather be allowed to work full-time in order to pay
restitution. See id. at 8 (suggesting beneficial remedy).
5. See Interview with Laurel F. Grass, supra note 1 (recalling from personal
experience that most payments are simply discontinued).
6. See Affidavit of Probable Cause at 1-3, Commonwealth v. DeSimone, No.
1774-99 (Pa. Ct. Common Pleas 1999) (statement of Det. Steven G. Cassel, Lans-
dale Borough Police Department detailing nature of employment and offenses at-
tributed to Linda DeSimone).
7. See id. at 1 (detailing bill collection service owned by DeSimone).
DeSimone was the sole proprietor of Quantum. See id. (noting that DeSimone was
sole proprietor). It is unclear whether she had any employees. When asked about
missing funds and a suspicious address change, DeSimone blamed these on an
employee, but when asked for a name, DeSimone claimed the employee had been
hired and fired under an alias. See Incident Report, Commonwealth v. DeSimone,
Incident No. 98-4756 (Pa. Ct. Common Pleas 1999) Jan. 25, 1999 (noting
DeSimone's claim that this employee used an alias).
8. See Affidavit of Probable Cause at 1, DeSimone (detailing contract between
Quantum (DeSimone) and VMSC). VMSC contracted for bill collection services
in June 1996, and terminated Quantum's services on January 1, 1997. See id. (not-
ing VMSC's termination of DeSimone's services).
794
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various insurance companies and individuals, from whom DeSimone, act-
ing as Quantum, collected check payments. 9 DeSimone, however, never
paid VMSC. 10 Instead, she diverted the funds to a secret bank account
that she controlled.1 1 The judge imposed a sentence of five years proba-
tion and restitution.1 2
These are just two examples of what many would call lenient
sentences for economic or white-collar offenses. But is this wrong? Many
prosecutors think so.13 In particular, one prosecutor from the Montgom-
9. See id. at 2 (detailing collection of funds on behalf of VMSC). The arrange-
ment was that Quantum was to receive payments from various insurance carriers
and individuals who were billed for services rendered by VMSC and its two subsidi-
aries, North Penn Medical Transport ("NPMT") and Skippack Emergency Medical
Services ("SEMS"). See id. DeSimone received these funds and deposited them in
her First Service Bank account. See id. Then Quantum was to forward those col-
lected funds to VMSC, in the form of a check drawn on her First Service Bank
account, minus the agreed upon collection fee. See id. (detailing proposed pay-
ment arrangements). Detective Cassel detailed the operation:
I asked DeSimone how her business (Quantum) had handled the funds
received from various insurance carriers. DeSimone told me that the
funds would be placed into her First Service Bank account. The funds
would then be distributed to clients like the VMSC minus the collection
fee due. I asked DeSimone if the redistribution of the funds entailed an
electronic transfer and she stated that it did not and that a check would
be issued from her bank account to pay the client.
Incident Report, Commonwealth v. DeSimone, Incident No. 98-4756 (Pa. Ct. Com-
mon Pleas 1999) (Jan. 25, 1999).
10. See Affidavit of Probable Cause at 1, DeSimone (revealing that payments
received by Quantum were never distributed to VMSC).
11. See id. at 1-2 (detailing secret bank account and address change). In De-
cember 1996, Jack Metz, Administrator for VMSC, discovered that Quantum
changed its mailing address for billing purposes to DeSimone's home address in
Kulpsville, Pennsylvania, without notifying VMSC. See id. at 2 (noting change of
Quantum's mailing address). Investigation also showed that as of October 31,
1996, DeSimone changed the VMSC, NPMT and SEMS mailing addresses with
written notification to the insurance carriers, but without notice to or authoriza-
tion from VMSC, and that numerous payments from insurance carriers had been
sent to Quantum at the Kulpsville address. See id. (noting change of mailing ad-
dresses). The checks were deposited by DeSimone into two accounts at First Ser-
vice Bank that were directly controlled by DeSimone, who was listed as the sole
authorized designee account holder. See id. (noting that DeSimone was in control
of bank accounts). Also, investigation revealed that Quantum received numerous
checks from insurance carriers for VMSC services after the termination of Quan-
tum's employment. See id. None of these funds, totaling $21,491.40, were distrib-
uted to VMSC as required. See id. (noting total amount owed to VMSC).
12. See Sentence Recommendation Report, Commonwealth v. DeSimone, No.
1774-99 (Pa. Ct. Common Pleas 1999) (Sept. 7, 1999) (imposing sentence of five
years probation and requiring restitution payments amounting to $300).
DeSimone was charged with "Theft by Failure to Make Required Disposition of
Funds." See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3927(a) (1998) (defining elements of crime). As
a level 2 offense, theft by deception has a standard range of zero to thirty-six
months incarceration under the Pennsylvania Guidelines. See PA SENTENCING
GUIDELINES, supra note 2, at § 303.16 (providing sentencing matrix).
13. See, e.g., Martin F. Murphy, No Room at the Inn? Punishing White Collar
Criminals, BOSTON BARJ., May/June 1996, at 5, 14 (suggesting that white collar and
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ery County (Pa.) District Attorney's Office, Laurel F. Grass, thinks so. 14
Her position, and apparently that of many other prosecutors, is that com-
plicated and time-consuming investigations make for a relatively stagger-
ing caseload, allowing only limited prosecutorial attention for each
economic crime offender. 15 Prosecution of violent crime offenders makes
much more political sense because it answers public outcries to "get tough
on violent crime." 16 As a result, prosecutors must mete out their budgets
accordingly. This is simply part of the price society pays for protection
from violent offenders. 17
economic offenders historically have been treated with leniency in sentencing).
First Assistant D.A. Murphy, First Assistant District Attorney for Middlesex County,
Massachusetts, suggests that there are two problems with the sentencing disparity
between white collar/economic crimes and the more typical street crimes. See id.
at 14 (identifying broad social impact of sentencing system). First, the disparity
impacts more heavily on minorities. See id. (noting disparate impact for minori-
ties). Second, white collar crime imposes considerable costs on society. See id.
(noting relationship between economic impact and white collar crime). One com-
mentator stated that "[t] he economic loss resulting from bank robberies pales in
comparison to the $6 billion cost of criminal fraud in the savings and loan indus-
try." Id. Another commentator stated that "[i]n 1989, bank robberies in the
United States totaled $24.6 million in losses, with the average 'take' being $3,951."
Id. (quoting TONY G. POVEDA, RETHINKING WHITE COLLAR CRIME 11 (1994)). First
Assistant D.A. Murphy quotes former U.S. Attorney General Richard Thornburgh
as saying that "[a] street criminal can steal only what he can carry. With the stroke
of a pen, or the push of a computer key, white-collar criminals can, and do, steal
billions." Id. (quoting Richard L. Thornburgh, Forward to Sixth Survey of White Col-
lar Crime, 28 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 383-84 (1991)); see G. Robert Blakey & Scott D.
Cessar, Equitable Relief Under Civil RICO: Reflections on Religious Technology Center
v. Wollersheim: Will Civil RICO Be Effective Only Against White Collar Crime, 62 NOTRE
DAME L. REv. 526, 568 n.191 (suggesting that leniency toward white collar offend-
ers may "provide lower class and working class individuals with justifications for
their own violation of the law"). Associate Attorney General Stephen S. Trott sug-
gested that widespread fraud in legitimate business undermines this country's eco-
nomic foundation:
The example of criminal enterprises, and also supposedly legitimate en-
terprises, routinely operating by means of kickbacks, bribes, persistent
frauds, and other kinds of illegal conduct, is infectious. The attitude de-
velops that, since "everybody does it," it makes no sense for a small busi-
ness or an individual to try to succeed solely by honest means. The result
is widespread public cynicism, and an overall erosion of deterrence.
Oversight on Civil RICO Suits: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciay, 99th
Cong. 109-11 (1985) (statement of Associate Attorney General Stephen S. Trott).
14. See Interview with Laurel F. Grass, supra note 1 (commenting generally on
leniency of economic offender sentencing).
15. See id. (noting that only limited resources are available for prosecuting
economic crime offenders); see also Murphy, supra note 13, at 16 (noting local
district attorneys' limited resources for investigating and prosecuting white collar
crime).
16. See Murphy, supra note 13, at 16 (noting that "street crime is public's top
priority"); Interview with Laurel F. Grass, supra note 1 (commenting on political
nature of criminal prosecution).
17. See Interview with Laurel F. Grass, supra note 1 (suggesting that costs of
economic crime are borne by general public in fear of violent crime).
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That is, however, not the end of it. The relatively sparse prosecution
of economic offenders is coupled with, and compounded by, relatively le-
nient sentencing by the judiciary.18 There are several theories for this le-
niency, some seemingly valid, others somewhat specious. 19  The
combination of sparse prosecution and lenient sentencing acts as a double
incentive that practically promotes economic crime.
20
This Comment discusses the perception of lenient economic crime
offender sentencing in Pennsylvania. Part II summarizes the origin and
history of sentencing guidelines. 2 1 This section examines various state
sentencing guidelines as well as the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, with a
focus on the treatment of economic or white collar offenders by the fed-
18. See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Com-
promises Upon Which They Rest, 17 HOSTRA L. REv. 1, 20 (1988) (noting that white
collar offenders typically receive probation, and if sentenced to prison, less severe
sentences); Ami L. Feinstein et al., Eighth Survey of White Collar Crime, Procedural
Issues, Federal Sentencing, 30 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1079, 1094 (1993) (noting percep-
tion of leniency in white collar offender sentencing); Murphy, supra note 13, at 14
(noting that white collar offenders "frequently do not receive sentences that reflect
the seriousness of their offenses").
19. See Murphy, supra note 13, at 5 (noting theories for leniency toward white
collar criminals). First Assistant D.A. Murphy suggests several theories for this his-
torical leniency. See id. (outlining theories). First, he suggests that many judges
have historically viewed direct and violent acts against individuals as more serious
and deserving of more severe punishment. See id. (noting that common street
crimes are distinguishable from purely economic crime because they often involve
violence). Second, many judges believed that "for white collar criminals, who typi-
cally had no criminal record, the process of investigation, indictment and convic-
tion was itself a form of punishment, and in some cases, punishment enough." Id.
Finally, he quotes other scholars who emphasize that "there is one shadowy consid-
eration that troubles manyjudges. That is the possibility that they will treat white-
collar offenders differently because they can empathize with their plight. Being
able more easily to identify with them, they may be prone to leniency." Id. at 5
(quoting STANTON WHEELER ET AL., SIrING IN JUDGMENT: THE SENTENCING OF
WHITE-COLLAR CRIMINALS 160 (1988)). This historical leniency, he adds, has a
disproportionate impact on minority offenders, and turns lenient white collar sen-
tencing into lenient white sentencing. See id. at 14 (emphasis added).
20. See Blakey & Cessar, supra note 13, at 568 n.191 (noting civil nature of
white collar crime). Blakey and Cessar note several limitations placed upon prose-
cutors in litigating white-collar criminal cases:
Resources available for investigation and prosecution are scarce. The
common law criminal trial is ponderous. The cases are complex. Of-
fenders will be most often treated as "first offenders" even if they had
actually engaged in a pattern of behavior over a substantial period of
time. Indeed, while the proceeding is in form criminal, it is in substance
civil, for a fine, not imprisonment, is the norm for white-collar offenders.
Id. Further, they add, the government is "less than effective in its enforcement of
fines," noting that "most of the 22,532 cases of unpaid federal fines totaling $185.6
million involved white collar crime." Id. (citing Unpaid U.S. Fines Total $185 Mil-
lion, Panel Told, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 1983, at A3).
21. For a discussion of the origin and history of sentencing guidelines, see
infra notes 26-46 and accompanying text.
5
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eral guidelines. 22 Part II will conclude with a detailed examination of the
treatment of economic crime offenders by the Pennsylvania Sentencing
Guidelines.23 Part III evaluates the current status of economic crime of-
fender sentencing in Pennsylvania and the effect this sentencing posture
has on society. 24 Part IV provides an outlook on, and suggestions for, fu-
ture economic crime prosecutions.
25
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Origin and History of Sentencing Guidelines
Prior to the arrival of sentencing guidelines, Pennsylvania used "inde-
terminate" or individualized sentencing. 26 This type of sentencing gave
judges wide discretion and allowed them to consider the individual char-
acteristics of the offender and the circumstances of the crime, with reha-
bilitation of the offender as the goal. 27 Also,judges sentenced defendants
22. For a discussion of other states' sentencing guidelines, see infra notes 47-
86 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines,
see infra notes 87-124 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the treatment of
white collar offenders by the federal guidelines, see infra notes 125-30 and accom-
panying text.
23. For a discussion of the Pennsylvania Guidelines and the treatment of
white collar offenders under the Pennsylvania Guidelines, see infra notes 131-47
and accompanying text.
24. For a discussion of the current approach to sentencing white collar of-
fenders under the Pennsylvania Guidelines, see infra notes 148-57 and accompany-
ing text.
25. For outlook and suggestions regarding future economic crime prosecu-
tions, see infra notes 158-68 and accompanying text.
26. See Ivan S. DeVoren, Criminal Law-Judicial Discretion in Sentencing--Com-
monwealth v. Devers, Pennsylvania Supreme Court Review, 1988 Recent Decisions, 62
TEMP. L. REV. 729-36 (1989) (noting history of sentencing practices); Donald W.
Dowd, What Frankel Hath Wrought, 40 VILL. L. REv. 301 (1995) (same).
27. See Commonwealth v. Martin, 351 A.2d 650, 656-57 (Pa. 1976) (explaining
indeterminate sentencing). At the time of Martin, Pennsylvania law, espousing in-
determinate sentencing, provided that:
Whenever any person, convicted in any court of this Commonwealth of
any crime punishable by imprisonment in a State penitentiary, shall be
sentenced to imprisonment therefor ... the court, instead of pronounc-
ing..., a definite or fixed term of imprisonment, shall pronounce ... a
sentence of imprisonment for an indefinite term: Stating in such sen-
tence the minimum and maximum limits thereof; and the maximum
limit shall never exceed the maximum time now or hereafter prescribed
as a penalty for such offense; and the minimum shall never exceed one-
half of the maximum sentence prescribed by any court.
Act ofJune 19, 1911, Pub. L. No. 1055, § 6 (codified as amended PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
19, § 1057 (West 1964)). Pennsylvania, as well as other states, encompassed a reha-
bilitative goal within its indeterminate sentencing laws. See FRANCES A. ALLEN, THE
DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL: PENAL POLICY AND SOCIAL PURPOSE 6 (1981)
(stating that indeterminate sentencing is reflection of rehabilitative ideal); NORVAL
MoRRis, THE FuTuRE OF IMPRISONMENT 26-43 (1974) (outlining critiques of rehabil-
itative goal of indeterminate sentencing); DeVoren, supra note 26, at 730 (outlin-
ing history of sentencing practices); Dowd, supra note 26, at 301-05 (outlining
critiques of rehabilitative goal of indeterminate sentencing); Ilene H. Nagel, For-
[Vol. 45: p. 793
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to "a range of incarceration rather than to a definite term."28 The theory
behind indeterminate sentencing is that every crime and every criminal
are different. 29 Under this approach, the particular circumstances of the
crime and the characteristics of the criminal are taken into account in
order to rehabilitate the criminal more effectively.30
Indeterminate sentencing began to lose favor in Pennsylvania and
other states in the 1970s.31 First, courts abandoned rehabilitation as a pur-
pose, with many jurisdictions instead espousing retribution as the primary
goal of sentencing.32 Second, indeterminate sentencing was seen as un-
fair, as the unbridled discretion ofjudges left a wake of disparate, inconsis-
tent, disproportionate and seemingly arbitrary sentences.33 States thereby
ward to Structuring Sentencing Discretion: The New Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 80 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 883, 893-99 (1990) (same).
28. DeVoren, supra note 26, at 730; cf. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 1057 (West
1964) (stating that sentence must have minimum and maximum limits).
29. See ANDREW VON HIRSCH, PAST OR FUTURE CRIMES: DESERVEDNESS AND DAN-
GEROUSNESS IN THE SENTENCING OF CRIMINALS 3 (1985) (explaining that individual-
ized sentencing allows for consideration of each crime in relation to each
individual).
30. See Martin, 351 A.2d at 658 (setting forth guidelines for individualized ap-
proach to sentencing); see also ALLEN, supra note 27, at 6 (discussing rehabilitation
as principal goal of sentencing); MoRRIS, supra note 27, at 24-43 (same); DeVoren,
supra note 26, at 730 (stating that indeterminate sentencing requires courts to con-
sider circumstances of crime and characteristics of criminals in efforts to rehabili-
tate offender more effectively); Nagel, supra note 27, at 893-99 (stating that
rehabilitation should be primary objective of sentencing).
The Martin court interpreted the intermediate sentencing legislation to re-
quire courts to impose "the minimum amount of confinement that is consistent
with the protection of the public, the gravity of the offense, and the rehabilitative
needs of the defendant .... At least two factors are crucial to such determina-
tion-the particular circumstances of the offense and the character of the
defendant."
31. See Barbara S. Barrett, Sentencing Guidelines: Recommendations for Sentencing
Reform, 57 Mo. L. REV. 1077, 1078 (1992) (noting that support for indeterminate
sentencing began to crumble in early 1970s); DeVoren, supra note 26, at 730 (not-
ing that rehabilitative needs of defendant must be considered in sentencing deci-
sion); Dowd, supra note 26, at 302 (noting that "assumptions behind the consensus
on individualized sentencing were under attack from all sides"); Gary T. Lowen-
thal, Mandatory Sentencing Laws: Undermining the Effectiveness of Determinate Sentencing
Reform, 81 CAL. L. REv. 61, 61-62 (1993) (noting that last 20 years have seen signifi-
cant changes in sentencing law). See generally Jodeen M. Hobbs, Comment, Struc-
turing Sentencing Discretion in Pennsylvania: Are Guidelines Still a Viable Option in Light
of Commonwealth v. Devers?, 69 TEMP. L. REV. 941 (1996) (noting that Penn-
sylvania legislature sought to control sentencing discretion in 1970s).
32. See Barrett, supra note 31, at 1079 (noting that sentencing philosophy
shifted from treatment to deserved punishment); Dowd, supra note 26, at 302 (not-
ing that rehabilitative goal of sentencing had fallen out of favor); Lowenthal, supra
note 31, at 63 (noting that most jurisdictions have abandoned rehabilitation as
goal of sentencing).
33. See Barrett, supra note 31, at 1078-79 (noting concerns of disparity in
length of sentences for defendants who committed similar crimes); DeVoren, supra
note 26, at 731 (noting "perceived problems of unwarranted disparity and undue
leniency" in sentencing); Dowd, supra note 26, at 302 (noting critics' concerns of
20001 799
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began instituting determinate sentencing schemes, typically in the form of
various types of sentencing guidelines.
3 4
States have adopted one of two types of determinate sentencing
schemes.3 5 Some state legislatures have prescribed a statutory presump-
tive sentence for each crime, with permissible deviations in the form of
aggravating and mitigating circumstances.3 6 Other states, as well as Con-
irrational disparity in sentencing, resulting in unequal justice and oppression of
poor and minorities); Lowenthal, supra note 31, at 63 (noting concerns of unwar-
ranted disparity, disproportionate punishment and inconsistent punishment for
similar crimes).
34. See Barrett, supra note 31, at 1078 ("Since 1970, many states and the fed-
eral government have shifted to determinate sentencing."); Lowenthal, supra note
31, at 61 (noting that "in the last twenty years ... most jurisdictions have adopted
determinate sentencing schemes that narrow the range of sanctions available to
trial courts and reduce or eliminate the broad discretion previously exercised by
corrections administrators and parole boards"); Hobbs, supra note 31, at 941 (not-
ing that Pennsylvania sought to control sentencing discretion by creating standards
or guidelines for trial courts to consider when sentencing offenders for felonies or
misdemeanors).
Determinate sentencing is defined as a system of standards or guidelines that
constrain judicial discretion in sentencing and create uniformity and proportional-
ity therein. See Barrett, supra note 31, at 1078 (defining determinate sentencing).
One commentator states that "[s] entencing guidelines are a popular manifestation
of determinate sentencing." Id.
35. See Lowenthal, supra note 31, at 63 (noting two general types of determi-
nate sentencing). Determinate sentencing schemes generally narrow the wide
range of sanctions available to sentencing courts, and reduce or eliminate the for-
merly broad discretion afforded parole boards and corrections administrators. See
id. at 61 (discussing how set sentencing schemes narrow judicial sanctioning abil-
ity). Prior to the current practice, judges typically set the maximum terms of an
individual sentence, and parole boards set the actual confinement period within
that judicially determined maximum. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361,
364-65 (1989) (describing allocation of discretion between Congress, which de-
fined maximum sentence, judiciary, which imposed sentences within statutory
range, and parole board, which determined actual duration of sentence, in federal
sentencing).
36. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1170, 3000, 3040 (West Supp. 2000) (enact-
ing California's determinate sentencing system). The California legislature found
that "the elimination of disparity and the provision of uniformity of sentences can
best be achieved by determinate sentences fixed by statute in proportion to the
seriousness of the offense as determined by the Legislature to be imposed by the
court with specified discretion." § 1170(a) (1). California was the first state to pass
this type of sentencing legislation. See Lowenthal, supra note 31, at 63 (noting that
California was first state to pass presumptive sentence law). Other states followed
California's lead in passing presumptive sentence legislation. See, e.g., ALASKA
STAT. §§ 12.55.125 to 12.55.145, 12.55.155 to 12.55.165 (Michie 1998) (enacting
presumptive sentence legislation); ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-701 to 13-702 (West
1989 & Supp. 1999) (same); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-105 (1999) (same); IND. CODE
ANN. §§ 35-50-2-1 to 35-50-2-10 (West 1998) (same); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340
(1999) (same).
[Vol. 45: p. 793
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gress, have required judges to follow sentencing guidelines promulgated
by a statutorily created state sentencing commission.
3 7
Some states have also enacted "mandatory minimum" laws along with
their determinate sentencing schemes.3 8 Mandatory minimum laws im-
pose a mandatory sentence, or an enhancement to an existing sentence,
when a specified circumstance exists in connection with the commission
of a certain crime.3 9 Two theories support mandatory minimum sentenc-
ing laws. 40 First, deterrence results from increased certainty and severity
of incarceration. 41 Second, the incapacitation of criminals results in their
separation from the law-abiding general public.4 2 Although politically
popular, mandatory minimum sentencing laws have created more than
37. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 244.09 (West 1992 & Supp. 2000) (providing
for mandatory minimum sentences); 204 PA. CODE § 303.1 (1997) (same); WASH.
REv. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.310 (West Supp. 2000) (same).
38. See Lowenthal, supra note 31, at 64 (noting that states have increasingly
enacted mandatory minimum sentencing laws). These mandatory minimum sen-
tencing laws usually have severe penalty provisions. See id. (noting severity of pen-
alty provisions). By 1992, 46 states had at least some mandatory minimum
sentence enhancement laws, and by 1993, over 100 separate federal provisions re-
quired mandatory minimum sentences. See id. at 64-65 (describing shift in crimi-
nal justice policies); see also Marc Mauer, Americans Behind Bars, CriM. JusT., Winter
1992, at 16 (same).
39. See Lowenthal, supra note 31, at 69 (describing operation of mandatory
sentence enhancement provisions). Mandatory minimum laws can take on several
different forms: (1) an offender serving a mandatory minimum term that other-
wise would not be applicable to the offense; (2) an increase in both the statutory
minimum and maximum sentences that may be imposed; (3) consecutive
sentences for the underlying offense and the enhancement-triggering offense; (4)
an increase in sentence severity by restricting administrative discretion with regard
to parole eligibility or prohibiting "good behavior" prison term reductions; (5) any
combination of these elements, requiring certain and lengthy incarceration. See
id. at 67-68 (describing various mandatory minimum laws).
40. See id. at 67 (noting theories that support mandatory minimum sentenc-
ing laws).
41. See id. (noting purposes of mandatory sentence enhancement provisions).
Prohibiting courts from suspending sentences increases the likelihood of incarcer-
ation, while statutory devices increase the severity of sentences. See id. (describing
impact of mandatory minimum sentencing schemes).
42. See id. (noting purposes of mandatory sentence enhancement provisions).
The goal of incapacitation has been met for the most part, as prison populations
have increased dramatically since the inception of determinate and fixed sentenc-
ing laws. See Andrew H. Malcolm, More Cells for More Prisoners, But to What End,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 1991, at B16 (noting skyrocketing prison populations). Be-
tween 1980 and 1991, the overall crime rate in the United States decreased by
3.5%. See Mauer, supra note 38, at 16 (describing drop in crime rate and growth of
prison population). Despite the decreased crime rate, the number of people be-
hind bars in that same time period doubled. See id. at 16 (citing statistics); see also
Thomas B. Marvell, Sentencing Guidelines and Prison Population Growth, 85 J. CRiM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 696, 696 (1995) (noting that between 1968 and 1993, United
States prison populations have increased nearly 400%).
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their share of debate, especially when used in conjunction with some form
of determinate sentencing scheme.43
Some commentators have claimed that although the initial goal of the
sentencing guidelines was to remedy sentencing disparity, this goal has
been partially supplanted by concerns of an exploding prison popula-
tion.44 Some state legislatures have specifically charged guideline commis-
sions with tailoring sentences according to prison capacity.45 This shift in
goals is a reflection of the realization that finite prison resources need to
43. See Lowenthal, supra note 31, at 64, 106 (noting that "[u]nlike compre-
hensive determinate sentencing reforms, the single-factor sentence enhancement
laws have been enacted piecemeal, usually during election years" and noting cross
purposes of mandatory sentence enhancement provisions and determinate sen-
tencing schemes). Professor Lowenthal claims that "[t] he mandatory sentence en-
hancement laws enacted during the past two decades have undermined the goals
of the contemporaneous sentencing reform movement." Id. at 105-06. The rea-
son, according to Professor Lowenthal, is because mandatory sentence enhance-
ments have become an appealing tool for prosecutors, "used primarily as
prosecutorial bargaining chips and . . . only infrequently enforced in actual
sentences." Id. at 107. By offering the dismissal of mandatory sentence enhance-
ments in exchange for guilty pleas, prosecutors can concentrate on other matters.
See id. (noting that because "prosecutors must balance the needs of disposing of
their case load and maintaining conviction rates with the competing and some-
times conflicting goal of ensuring consistent punishment ... [p]lea bargaining
thus becomes an appealing tool"). The disparity arises between those who plea
bargain and those who do not. Professor Lowenthal notes that "[m]any of the
offenders who received sentences without the mandatory enhancements for which
they were eligible had committed offenses as serious as those of the offenders who
did receive enhanced sentences." Id. at 107-08.
44. See Marvell, supra note 42, at 697 (noting that purpose of guidelines has
evolved over time). Professor Marvell notes that:
although their original purpose was to reduce sentencing disparity, the
guidelines have acquired a second function in several states: to limit
prison population growth by tailoring sentences to prison capacity. Legis-
lators who either worried about prison costs, or were not persuaded that
more imprisonment effectively reduced crime, required the guideline au-
thors to consider prison capacity.
Id. (citations omitted).
45. See, e.g., Richard S. Frase, Implementing Commission-Based Sentencing Guide-
lines: The Lessons of the First Ten Years in Minnesota, 2 CORNELLJ.L. & PUB. POL'Y 279,
329 (1993) (noting that "[a]lthough the 1978 enabling statute only required the
[Minnesota Sentencing] Commission to take existing correctional resources into
'substantial consideration,' the Commission chose to treat prison capacity as a con-
trolling factor in drafting and implementing the Guidelines"); Laird C. Kirkpat-
rick, Mandatory Felony Sentencing Guidelines: The Oregon Model, 25 U.C. DAVIS L. Rv.
695, 697 (1992) (noting that one impetus behind Oregon's adoption of sentenc-
ing guidelines was prison overcrowding); Lowenthal, supra note 31, at 72 n.50
(noting that guidelines commissions take availability of correctional resources into
account when establishing sentencing ranges); Murphy, supra note 13, at 15 (not-
ing that Massachusetts Sentencing Commission is charged with recommending
sentencing policies that ration prison capacity so as to "afford sufficient capacity to
incarcerate violent offenders").
[Vol. 45: p. 793
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be balanced with society's desire to be protected from the most dangerous
offenders.
46
B. Examples of State Sentencing Guidelines
1. The Minnesota Experience: The Pioneer State in the Sentencing Guidelines
Effort
Minnesota was the first state to use an independent commission to
enact a comprehensive system of sentencing reforms in the form of guide-
lines. 47 The Minnesota legislature created a Guidelines Commission
("Minnesota Commission") to promulgate guidelines regulating both the
decision to impose imprisonment and the duration of the imprison-
ment.48 In creating these guidelines, the Minnesota Commission was to
sentence offenders based on "reasonable offense and offender characteris-
tics," taking into substantial consideration "current sentencing and release
practices [and] correctional resources." 49 The Minnesota Commission
promulgated the Minnesota Guidelines in the form of a matrix, with of-
fense severity on the vertical axis, the defendant's criminal history on the
horizontal axis, and each block representing a narrow, specified range of
incarceration time.
50
The Minnesota Guidelines have evolved over the years. The most im-
portant changes involved reducing prison term durations at low severity
levels in order to stay within prison capacity limits, while increasing dura-
tions at high severity levels. 5 1 In addition, courts have defined acceptable
46. See Murphy, supra note 13, at 15 (noting higher priority placed on incar-
cerating violent offenders when prison capacity must be rationed).
47. See Frase, supra note 45, at 279 (noting that Minnesota was first state to
enact sentencing guidelines). Minnesota's Sentencing Guidelines have been in
effect since 1980, the result of a 1978 enabling statute. See Act of Apr. 5, 1978, ch.
723, 1978 Minn. Laws 761, 765 (codified as amended at MINN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 244.09-244.11 (West 1992 & Supp. 2000)) (creating sentencing commission for
purpose of promulgating sentencing guidelines).
48. See Frase, supra note 45, at 281-82 (outlining goals of Minnesota's Guide-
lines Commission). The three explicit goals of the Minnesota Sentencing Guide-
lines are: (1) to create more uniformity in sentencing procedures in an attempt to
prevent racial, gender and social class disparities; (2) to promote proportionality
of prison commitment rates and duration to offense seriousness, and; (3) to avoid
prison over-crowding. See MINN. R. OF CT. § 1 (stating purpose and principles of
guidelines); see also Frase, supra note 45, at 281 (describing goals).
49. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 244.09(5) (2).
50. See § 244 app. at 545 (providing matrix).
51. See Frase, supra note 45, at 285-87 (noting that durations at severity levels
one to three, with medium to high criminal history, were lowered due to prison
capacity concerns, though some durations at higher severity levels were increased).
Several changes occurred between 1980 and 1988. First, mandatory minimum
prison terms increased for the use of a dangerous weapon, as well as the number
of offenses applicable to such mandatory minimums. See id. at 287. Second, a
1981 provision allowed a court to stay a conviction for intrafamily sexual abuse if
the court found that it was in the best interest of the complainant or family unit
and the offender was amenable to treatment. See id. Third, a 1987 provision ad-
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departures from the Minnesota Guidelines on a case by case basis.5 2 The
Minnesota Supreme Court has held that certain factors could not be taken
into account to justify departures when the same factors had already been
considered in drafting the guidelines. 53 The court additionally ruled that
downward departures were largely immune to review, as the court did not
wish to substitute its judgment for that of the sentencing court.54 In a
separate line of cases, the Minnesota Supreme Court has favored the dis-
positional departures (as opposed to durational departures) based on in-
dividualized assessments of the defendants' amenability to probation or
prison. 55 Further fine-tuning of the guidelines produced mandatory mini-
mums for drug crimes, and a higher maximum sentences for certain vio-
lent crimes and sex crimes. 56 Importantly, these "get tough" measures
coincided with a change of heart regarding the primary consideration in
setting the Minnesota Guidelines: the main focus would now be public
safety and not the availability of correctional resources. 57 Although prison
space availability remains a factor, it is no longer a substantial factor to be
taken into account.58
ding "amenable to treatment" language to mandatory minimum repeat sex of-
fender statute. See id. at 287.
52. See id. at 288-90 (summarizing Minnesota cases allowing departures for
variety of reasons).
53. See State v. Schmit, 329 N.W.2d 56, 58 (Minn. 1983) (noting that depar-
tures cannot be based on special needs for deterrence); State v. Hagen, 317
N.W.2d 701, 703 (Minn. 1982) (holding that departures cannot be based on dan-
ger imposed by any individual defendant); State v. Evans, 311 N.W.2d 481, 483
(Minn. 1981) (holding that upward durational departures should not normally
exceed twice presumptive sentence lengths).
54. See State v. Kindem, 313 N.W.2d 6, 7 (Minn. 1981) (stating that "[al-
though] we do not intend entirely to close the door.., it would be a rare case
which would warrant reversal of the refusal to depart"). State trial decisions choos-
ing not to depart were largely insulated from review after Kindem. See Frase, supra
note 45, at 289 (noting insulation from appellate review after Kindem).
55. See, e.g., State v. Trog, 323 N.W.2d 28, 31 (Minn. 1982) (upholding down-
ward dispositional departure based on defendant's unamenability to probation,
noting aberrational and uncharacteristic nature of crime, rather than treatment
needs); State v. Randolph, 316 N.W.2d 508, 510 (Minn. 1982) (holding that courts
must grant defendant's request for execution of presumptive stayed prison term
when trial court's proposed conditions would be more severe than actual prison
term); State v. Hernandez, 311 N.W.2d 478, 481 (Minn. 1981) (holding criminal
history points may accrue on single day when defendant is sentenced concurrently
for more than one offense); State v. Wright, 310 N.W.2d 461, 462-63 (Minn. 1981)
(upholding downward dispositional departure based on findings that defendant
was unusually vulnerable and thus unamenable to prison); State v. Park, 305
N.W.2d 775, 776 (Minn. 1981) (upholding upward dispositional departure of com-
mitment to prison rather than presumptive stayed term based on defendant's
unamenability to probation).
56. See Act of June 1, 1989, ch. 290, 1989 Minn. Laws 1581 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of Minn. Statutes) (adopting "get tough" measures).
57. See Frase, supra note 45, at 292 (noting that primary goal of Guidelines was
public safety and not prison space availability).
58. See id. (identifying public safety as primary goal of Guidelines).
[Vol. 45: p. 793
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Minnesota's experience with sentencing guidelines has generally
been positive. 59 Sentences have been more uniform, and racial disparity
has been greatly reduced.60 Furthermore, despite "get tough" measures
and a seventy percent increase in the state's felony caseload, Minnesota
has managed to control prison overcrowding. 6' Finally, the Minnesota
Guidelines control discretion but still give judges and prosecutors enough
flexibility to tailor sentencing to individual offenders. 62 The, Minnesota
sentencing structure has shown relative success and a long-term fulfill-
ment of its goals; as a result Minnesota is seen as a model for other
jurisdictions. 63
2. The Oregon Experience: Gearing a Sentencing System Toward Prison
Capacity
Oregon's approach to sentencing guidelines originated as a public
backlash against its parole board's early release practices. 64 Oregon
59. See id. at 333-36 (noting successes of Minnesota Guidelines, and that
"viewed in proper perspective, the Minnesota Guidelines remain an impressive and
achievable model"). Despite its successes, however, the Minnesota Guidelines have
not completely eradicated racial disparity, as blacks have had consistently lower
rates of downward mitigated dispositional departures than whites. See id. at 335
(noting persistent racial sentencing disparity). Also, Minnesota's Sentencing Com-
mission, although conceived as an independent, non-political body, was not com-
pletely immune to the 1980s media-fanned political pressure to "get tough" on
crime. See id. at 334 (noting that Minnesota was not "immune from popular pres-
sures to escalate prison rates and durations in response to short-term public
hysteria").
60. See id. at 335 (stating that guidelines helped Minnesota make its sentences
more uniform and avoid racial disparity in sentencing and prison use).
61. See id. at 334 (noting success in stemming prison overcrowding). Al-
though this achievement of controlling prison overpopulation has nothing to do
with the original goals of the Minnesota Guidelines, that is, truth-in-sentencing
and reducing disparity, controlling prison overcrowding is "perhaps the Minnesota
Guidelines' greatest 'success story.'" Id.
62. See id. at 336 (noting that Minnesota Guidelines control discretion but
remain flexible).
63. See id. (noting that Minnesota Guidelines serve as valuable model for
other states' sentencing control efforts). Professor Frase notes that:
[M] innesota's experience remains important because its Guidelines have
been in effect the longest and have been extensively studied and evalu-
ated .... This rich source of data and commentary, the extensive appel-
late case law interpreting the Guidelines, and a decade of legislative and
Commission-initiated amendments contain essential lessons for reform-
ers in other jurisdictions.
Id. at 279-80.
64. See Kirkpatrick, supra note 45, at 697 (noting image of state corrections
system as "revolving door"). Oregon has used a guidelines approach to controlling
sentencing since 1977, when it adopted parole guidelines that transferred sentenc-
ing control from trial courts to parole boards. See id. at 696 (noting sentencing
control transfer). Because the parole guidelines only affected those who actually
went to prison, however, disparities persisted as to which offenders received prison
sentences-these disparities led Oregon to adopt sentencing guidelines. See id.
(noting factors leading Oregon to pursue creation of sentencing guidelines).
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adopted early release practices in an attempt to eliminate sentencing dis-
parities between counties.65 However, the public began to perceive a "re-
volving door"justice system, and the backlash ensued.6 6 The Oregon state
legislature responded by charging the state's CriminalJustice Council with
developing a comprehensive scheme of sentencing guidelines ("Oregon
Guidelines"). 6 7 The CriminalJustice Council enacted the Oregon Guide-
lines to restore the public's confidence in the state's criminal justice sys-
tem, addressing sentencing disparity as a collateral result.
68
Between 1977 and 1987, Oregon's prison population more than
doubled, nearly outgrowing the state's prison capacity. 69 As a result, the
65. See id. at 697 (noting inter-county sentencing disparities). There was a
significant amount of inter-county disparity in each counties' usage of state prison
resources. See id. (noting that "some county's sentenced similarly situated offend-
ers to prison at a much higher rate than other counties"). The parole board at-
tempted to remedy this disparity with early release programs for some offenders
who were at the low end of the parole matrix. See id. (describing parole board's
early release program).
66. See id. (noting public backlash). This situation created a public backlash
when many offenders soon reappeared on the streets after serving only a fraction
of their sentences. See id. Another goal of Oregon was the control of prison popu-
lations, because Oregon's prison population doubled between 1977 and 1987. See
id. (noting doubling of prison population with no proportionate increase in prison
capacity).
67. See 1985 Or. Laws 558, § 3 (directing Oregon's Criminal Justice Council to
reform sentencing). The statute directed the Oregon Criminal Justice Council to:
(1) Study and make recommendations concerning the functioning of
the various parts of the criminal justice system, including study and
recommendations concerning implementation of community correc-
tions programs;
(2) Study and make recommendations concerning the coordination of
the various parts of the criminal justice system;
(3) Conduct research and evaluation of programs, methods and tech-
niques employed by the several components of the criminal justice
system;
(4) Study and make recommendations concerning the capacity, utiliza-
tion and type of state and local prison and jail facilities; and alterna-
tives to the same including the appropriate use of existing facilities
and programs, and the desirability of additional or different facilities
and programs;
(5) Study and make recommendations concerning methods of reducing
risk of future criminal conduct by offenders;
(6) Collect, evaluate and coordinate information and data related to or
produced by all parts of the criminal justice system ....
Id.
68. See Kirkpatrick, supra note 45, at 698 (noting public's loss of confidence).
The prison overcrowding and resultant "revolving door" problem caused the pub-
lic to lose confidence in the criminal justice system. See id. (noting loss of confi-
dence). The state legislature looked to sentencing guidelines to help the
corrections system restore its credibility by providing "truth-in-sentencing"; that is,
time actually served being closely in line with the actual sentence that was im-
posed. See id. (defining "truth-in-sentencing").
69. See id. at 697. The Oregon legislature recognized that sentencing guide-
lines could be an effective management tool for the state's corrections system.
Guidelines would allow the state to assess its current needs for additional prison
806 [Vol. 45: p. 793
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Oregon Guidelines were seen as a tool to alleviate this problem and were
keyed to available institutional capacity.70 Oregon was one of the first
states to promulgate such a capacity-based sentencing scheme.
7 1
The operation of the Oregon Guidelines is the familiar matrix, with
offense seriousness on one axis and any prior criminal history of the of-
fender on the other.72 Each cell of the matrix contains a relatively narrow
sentencing range, granting the judge some limited discretion to sentence
anywhere within that range.73 The final sentencing grid was weighted
heavily toward personal safety, with violent crimes receiving the most seri-
ous sanctions.
74
The Oregon Guidelines are mandatory, and trial judges must impose
sentences within the specified range unless there are "substantial and com-
pelling reasons" for departure. 7 5 The Oregon Guidelines set forth a list of
aggravating and mitigating factors to support such departures.76 Judges
cannot use aggravating factors that have already been considered in the
guidelines.77 Although sentences within the standard range are not re-
viewable, both the state and the defendant can appeal a standard range
departure that is allegedly not supported by substantial and compelling
reasons.
78
capacity, forecast future demand for prison capacity and generally regulate the
utilization of all aspects of the system. See id. (noting benefits of sentencing
guidelines).
70. See id. (noting Oregon legislature's recognition of lack of public confi-
dence in state criminal justice system).
71. See id. at 695; see also Kathleen M. Bogan, Constructing Felony Sentencing
Guidelines in an Already Crowded State: Oregon Breaks New Ground, 36 CRIME & DE-
LINQ. 467, 468 (1990) (addressing Oregon's prison overcrowding solution).
72. See Kirkpatrick, supra note 45, at 701 (describing grid system that deter-
mines sentence length).
73. See id. (describing judge's discretion). The sentencing judge "should se-
lect the center of the range in the usual case and reserve the upper and lower
limits for aggravating and mitigating factors insufficient to warrant a departure."
OR. ADMIN. R. 253-05-001 (1993).
74. See Kirkpatrick, supra note 45, at 703 (noting priority of protection); see
also Bogan, supra note 71, at 472 (same). The ranking of societal interests includes
personal safety at the top, followed by property rights, with the integrity of govern-
ment institutions coming in third. See id. (summarizing Oregon's offense ranking
system).
75. See OR. ADMIN. R. 253-08-001 (1993) (providing justification to depart
from standard range).
76. See OR. ADMIN. R. 253-08-002(1)(a) (1993) (providing mitigating factors
that would justify downward departure from standard range); OR. ADMIN. R. 253-
08-002(1) (b) (1993) (providing aggravating factors that would justify upward de-
parture from standard range).
77. See OR. ADMIN. R. 253-08-002(2) (1993) (prohibiting upward departure if
aggravating factor was already taken into account in guidelines).
78. See OR. REv. STAT. § 138.222(2) (a) (1999) (prohibiting review of
sentences falling within already promulgated standard ranges). An honest error in
computing the seriousness of the crime or the criminal history of the defendant is
reviewable. See OR. ADMIN. R. 138-08-002(2) (1993) (noting that honest errors are
reviewable). Both the state and the defendant may appeal a departure not sup-
20001
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One difficulty that arose was the issue of consecutive sentences and
the possibility that these sentences would provide an end-run around the
Oregon Guidelines which would result in the same sorts of disparities that
the guidelines were enacted to resolve. 79 The Criminal Justice Council
responded with a system that used a combination of the sentence for the
most serious offense, with first-time-offense sentences for the rest of the
offenses.80 Each criminal who is sentenced to prison is also sentenced to a
term of post-prison supervision.8 1 Violations of the conditions of this su-
pervision can result in a return to prison for up to six months.8 2
The Oregon sentencing system has resulted in a substantial increase
in incarceration time for offenders convicted of forcible sex and person
crimes, a modest increase for drug crimes, and a decrease in time served
for property crimes and driving offenses.8 3 Judges have departed from the
Oregon Guidelines in only six percent of cases, and the guidelines have
had little, if any, effect on the felony plea bargain rate.8 4 Perhaps most
important, prison population control-the original impetus for the Oregon
Guidelines-has been achieved.8 5 Whether the Oregon Guidelines have
been successful or not depends on the commentator: many minorities feel
the system is still biased, and that "if you're a black man, you're going to
prison."8 6
ported by substantial and compelling reasons. See OR. REV. STAT. § 138.222(3)
(1993) (allowing limited review of sentences departing from presumptive sentence
range to determine whether departure was supported by ample evidence and
whether court had substantial and compelling reasons to depart).
79. See Kirkpatrick, supra note 45, at 709 (noting concern over disparities
caused by consecutive sentences). This could happen through multiple victims of
the same crime or multiple instances of crime to the same victim. See id. (discuss-
ing consecutive sentences). If there were no limit, the total of the consecutive
sentences imposed could far exceed a sentence for a much more serious crime. See
id. (discussing consecutive sentences).
80. See OR. ADMIN. R. 253-12-020(2) (a) (1993) (providing that presumptive
term for consecutive sentences equals presumptive term for most serious offense,
plus possible maximum terms for each additional offense with first-time
offenders).
81. See OR. ADMIN. R. 253-05-002(2) (1993) (mandating one year post-prison
supervision for crime categories one to three, two years for categories four to six,
and three years for categories seven to eleven).
82. See id. (providing sanctions for violation of post-prison supervision).
83. See Kirkpatrick, supra note 45, at 713 n.56 (noting findings).
84. See id. (noting that Oregon Guidelines have not affected rate of plea bar-
gains). Ninety-two percent of felony cases plead out-the same rate as before the
Oregon Guidelines. See id.
85. See Marvell, supra note 42, at 703-04 (demonstrating regression results for
Oregon's prison population growth since enacting Oregon Guidelines).
86. Report of the Oregon Supreme Court Task Force on Racial/Ethnic Issues in the
Judicial System, 73 OR. L. REv. 823, 863 (1994) (quoting minority witness).
[Vol. 45: p. 793
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3. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines
Congress enacted the Sentencing Reform Act as part of the Compre-
hensive Crime Control Act of 198487 to "enhance the ability of the crimi-
nal justice system to combat crime through an effective, fair sentencing
system." 88 The Sentencing Reform Act created the United States Sentenc-
ing Commission (the "Commission"), a bipartisan, seven member commis-
sion, to establish "sentencing policies and practices" in the form of
guidelines that would provide certainty and fairness in sentencing and
avoid sentencing disparities among defendants with similar histories and
similar offenses.89 The guidelines would address the length of sentences,
types of sentences imposed and whether multiple sentences should run
concurrently or consecutively under given circumstances. 90 Three funda-
mental policies guided the Commission in its task.91 First, the Commis-
sion wanted to promote honesty in sentencing through determinate
sentences, irreducible by parole or good behavior credits. 92 Second, the
Commission wanted to achieve uniformity in sentencing across all federal
jurisdictions. 9 3 Third, the Commission wanted to achieve proportionality
between sentences of offenders convicted of crimes with varying severity
levels.9
4
The Commission faced a difficult obstacle, because conflicting theo-
ries regarding the purposes of punishment and sentencing, such as retri-
bution, deterrence, incapacitation and rehabilitation, proved difficult to
reconcile within one sentencing system with little guidance from Con-
gress.95 The Commission felt it unnecessary to choose between sentenc-
ing philosophies, however, and chose instead to structure the guidelines
based on the historical sentencing practices of the federal courts, resulting
in a guideline system that represents an "amalgam of views." 96 The Fed-
eral Sentencing Guidelines ("Federal Guidelines") became effective on
November 1, 1987.
9 7
A federal sentencing court sentences a defendant under the Federal
Guidelines according to information gathered by a United States proba-
87. 28 U.S.C. §§ 992-998 (1994).
88. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A, intro. cmt. 3 (1998).
89. See Feinstein et al., supra note 18, at 1080 (providing background of fed-
eral sentencing guidelines).
90. See id. at 1080-81 (detailing purpose of Sentencing Commission).
91. See id. at 1081 (detailing three guiding policies).
92. See id. (discussing policy of honesty).
93. See id. (discussing policy of uniformity).
94. See id. (discussing policy of proportionality).
95. See, e.g., id. at 1082 (detailing various theories of punishment and
sentencing).
96. See id. at 1082-83 (detailing approach Commission settled on in structur-
ing guidelines).
97. See id. at 1083 (noting effective date of Federal Guidelines). The Commis-
sion submitted the guidelines for congressional approval on April 13, 1987. See id.
20001
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tion officer, submitted to the court in a pre-sentence report.98 The court
first determines the base offense level, which is a numerical severity factor
based on the particular type of crime. 99 The court may then make adjust-
ments based on criteria such as victim characteristics, participation level of
the defendant in the crime, whether or not the defendant obstructed jus-
tice and whether the defendant has accepted responsibility for the
crime. 10 0 The court then considers the criminal history of the defendant,
under the theory that a repeat offender is more culpable than a first-time
offender. 10 1 After the court determines the offense level and criminal his-
tory points, the court applies the numbers to a grid, with criminal history
comprising the horizontal axis and offense level comprising the vertical
axis.10 2 At the intersection of these two values is the range in which the
judge must impose a sentence, and thus the limit of the sentencing judge's
discretion.1 03
The sentencing judge has one other remnant of discretion-a judge
may depart from the prescribed range, downward or upward, if he or she
feels there is an aggravating or mitigating circumstance present in the de-
fendant's case that was not taken into account in the formulation of the
Federal Guidelines. 10 4 The Federal Guidelines explicitly permit depar-
98. See id. at 1084 (describing pre-sentencing reporting process). The sen-
tencing court has the duty to ensure that the defendant and his or her counsel has
had the opportunity to examine and discuss the report, which must contain the
factors the court considered in its sentencing recommendation. See id. (noting
court's duty to inform defendant). The court must allow the defendant to address
the court before sentencing. See id. (noting court's duty to allow defendant to be
heard).
99. See id. at 1084-85 (describing application of guidelines). Each federal of-
fense has a corresponding base offense level. See id. at 1085 (describing offense
level). When determining the base offense, the court must consider acts or omis-
sions that are part of the charged offense. See id. The court must apply the Fed-
eral Guidelines to the offense actually charged to the defendant, rather than the
actual conduct in which the defendant engaged. See id.
100. See id. at 1085-86 (describing adjustments). Chapter three of the Federal
Guidelines details the adjustment process, with Part A providing for victim-related
adjustments, Part B providing for adjustments based on the role the defendant
played in the crime, Part C providing for adjustments based on whether the defen-
dant intentionally obstructed justice, Part D providing for adjustments for multiple
convictions and/or 'closely related counts and Part E providing for adjustments
based on the defendant's acceptance of responsibility for the crime or crimes com-
mitted. See id. at 1085-86 (illustrating how adjustments combine with base offense
level to create total offense level); see also Jim McHugh, The United States Sentencing
Guidelines: Justice for All or Justice for a Few?, 36 VILL. L. REV. 877, 903 n.33 (1991)
(detailing chronological application of Federal Guidelines).
101. See Feinstein et al., supra note 18, at 1086-87 (detailing application of
criminal history to sentencing procedure).
102. See id. at 1087 (describing sentencing grid that court must use to deter-
mine sentence).
103. See id. (describing range of sentencing at intersection of offense level
and criminal history on sentencing grid).
104. See id. at 1088 (describing departures from sentencing guidelines); Mc-
Hugh, supra note 100, at 903 (same).
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tures for two reasons.' 0 5 First, the Commission realized that it would be
impossible to account for every possible situation.' 0 6 Second, the Com-
mission believed judges would depart only rarely, as the Federal Guide-
lines reflected current sentencing practices.' 0 7 To determine whether a
departure is warranted, the court may examine the text, policy statements
and commentary of the Federal Guidelines.' 0 8 When a case falls outside
this "heartland" of typical cases, the court should consider a departure.' 0 9
Departures are generally not warranted when the factor used in justifying
the departure is already taken account of in the Federal Guidelines. 10 It
is possible, however, for the court to find that a departure is warranted
when a factor, already taken account of in the formulation of the Federal
Guidelines, is present in a "degree substantially in excess of that which
ordinarily is involved in the offense.""'
A defendant has a statutory right to appeal his or her sentence. 1
2
The circuits have developed various tests to review departures, which gen-
erally follow a three-step approach. 1 3 First, the circuit courts consider
105. See Feinstein et al., supra note 18, at 1088 (elaborating on nature and
purpose of sentencing departures).
106. See id. (noting impossibility of creating complete sentencing guidelines).
107. See id. (noting that judges already use aggravating and mitigating factors
in handing down criminal sentences).
108. See United States v. Aguilar-Pena, 887 F.2d 347, 349 (1st Cir. 1989) (hold-
ing that departure is permitted when "idiosyncratic circumstances warrant individ-
ualization of sentence beyond that which is possible within the comparatively close-
hewn parameters constructed by the guidelines").
109. See id. at 350 (noting that when any "court finds an atypical case ... it
may consider whether departure is warranted").
110. See United States v. Carey, 895 F.2d 318, 323 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding
that downward departure based on defendant's restitution is improper because
acceptance of responsibility is already incorporated in Federal Guidelines).
111. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5K2.0 (1998).
112. See 18 U.S.C. § 3742 (1994) (defining bases on which defendant may file
appeal). The statute states that a defendant may appeal an otherwise final sen-
tence if the sentence:
(1) was imposed in violation of law;
(2) was imposed as a result of an incorrect application of the sentencing
guidelines; or
(3) is greater than the sentence specified in the applicable guideline
range to the extent that the sentence includes a greater fine or term
of imprisonment, probation, or supervised release than the maxi-
mum established in the guideline range, or includes a more limiting
condition of probation or supervised release under section
3563(b) (6) or (b) (11) than the maximum established in the guide-
line range; or
(4) was imposed for an offense for which there is no sentencing guide-
line and is plainly unreasonable.
Id.
113. See United States v. Diaz-Villafane, 874 F.2d 43, 49 (1st Cir. 1989) (using
three-part test to review Guideline departure). The Diaz-Villafane court adopted
the three-part test and the Sixth, Eighth, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits followed suit
by expressly adopting this test. See, e.g., United States v. Weaver, 920 F.2d 1570,
1573 (11th Cir. 1991) (adopting three-part test formulated in Diaz-Villafane);
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whether the circumstances upon which the sentencing judge relied are
unusual enough to merit departure.1 14 Second, the courts consider
whether those circumstances actually existed. 1 5 Third, the courts con-
sider whether the direction and degree of departure were reasonable. 11 6
Any meaningful understanding of the Federal Guidelines depends
upon a firm grasp of the compromises that led to their creation.1 1 7 The
practical needs of administration, institutional considerations and the
competing goals of the criminal justice system all contributed to an end
result far different than originally envisioned.1 18 One of the fundamental
United States v. White, 893 F.2d 276, 277 (10th Cir. 1990) (same); United States v.
Lang, 898 F.2d 1378, 1379 (8th Cir. 1990) (same); United States v. Rodriguez, 882
F.2d 1059, 1067 (6th Cir. 1989) (same). The Second, Third, Seventh, Ninth and
District of Columbia Circuits have adopted substantially similar tests. See, e.g.,
United States v. Lira-Barraza, 941 F.2d 745, 746-47 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (hold-
ing that test is: (1) whether court had legal authority under guidelines to depart;
(2) whether factual findings prompting departure are clearly erroneous; and, (3)
whether departure was reasonable in light of Federal Guidelines); United States v.
Kikumura, 918 F.2d 1084, 1098 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding that findings of fact should
be left undisturbed unless clearly erroneous and that sentence departure must be
reasonable); United States v. Lara, 905 F.2d 599, 603 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding that
district court "has 'sensible flexibility' to depart under circumstances where such
action is not unreasonable"); United States v. Schmude, 901 F.2d 555, 560 (7th
Cir. 1990) (holding that question of degree of departure is reasonableness, and
that standard of review is deferential, "recognizing that sentencing judges should
be given considerable leeway in determining degree of departure"); United States
v. Burke, 888 F.2d 862, 869 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (giving deference to sentencing court
upon finding of reasonableness). The Fourth and Fifth Circuits employ similar
standards. See, e.g., United States v. Chester, 919 F.2d 896, 900 (4th Cir. 1990)
(applying clearly erroneous standard to review factual support of departure and
abuse of discretion standard to determine if departure factors are "of sufficient
importance ... that a sentence outside the Guidelines should result ... [and] if
the extent of the departure was reasonable"); United States v. Velasquez-Mercado,
872 F.2d 632, 637 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding that departure will be affirmed if
reasonable).
114. See Diaz-Villafane, 874 F.2d at 49 ("First, we assay the circumstances relied
on by the district court in determining that the case is sufficiently 'unusual' to
warrant departure.").
115. See id. ("Second, we consider whether the circumstances, if conceptually
proper, actually existed in the particular case.").
116. See id. ("Third ... the direction and degree of departure must, on ap-
peal, be measured by a standard of reasonableness.").
117. See Breyer, supra note 18, at 2 (noting that compromises permeate Fed-
eral Guidelines).
118. See id. at 2-3 (describing competing elements involved in formulation of
Federal Guidelines). The United States Sentencing Commission had to overcome
two differences between the federal government and the states with regard to sen-
tencing. See id. (comparing state and federal guidelines). First, the federal crimi-
nal code had 688 statutes to deal with, compared to a much smaller number of
crimes the typical state guidelines had to deal with. See id. at 3. For example, at
the time the United States Sentencing Commission began to write the Guidelines
in 1985, Minnesota, which already had its sentencing guideline system in place,
only had to cover 251 statutory crimes. See id. The United States Sentencing Com-
mission, on the other hand, had to deal with complex crimes included in statutes
such as the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1982), the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952
812
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compromises of the Federal Guidelines was between creating a "real-of-
fense" system versus a "charge-offense" system. 119 A charge-offense system
would tie punishments directly to the offense for which the defendant was
convicted, with deviations depending upon the presence of aggravating or
mitigating circumstances. 120 A real-offense system, on the other hand,
would tie punishments to the elements of the actual circumstances of the
case. 121 The methods of proof of additional harms, the procedural fair-
(1982 & Supp. IV 1986) and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1963 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). See id. (demonstrating com-
plex task of federal sentencing commission). Second, political homogeneity in the
states made it easier to achieve a consensus on such issues such as the goals of
sentencing guidelines, as opposed to the nation as a whole, where there is no such
consensus. See id. at 3-4 (distinguishing state and federal guidelines).
119. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A, intro. cmt. 4(a)
(1998) (stating that real-offense versus charge-offense sentencing was "[o ] ne of the
most important questions for the Commission to decide"); Breyer, supra note 18,
at 8-9 (noting that competition between real-offense and charge-offense sentenc-
ing rationales was "[t]he first inevitable compromise which faced the
Commission").
120. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A, intro, cmt. 4 (1998)
(stating that pure charge-offense system would only sentence defendants for
crimes with which they are charged, overlooking behavior that is harmful); see also
Breyer, supra note 18, at 8-9 (noting that charge-offense sentencing would tie pun-
ishment directly to offense for which defendant is convicted, and that "[t]he basic
premise underlying a 'charge offense' system is that the guideline punishment is
presumed to reflect the severity of the corresponding statutory crime").
121. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A, intro. cmt. 4 (1998)
(stating that real-offense sentencing bases sentences "upon the actual conduct in
which the defendant engaged regardless of the charges for which he was indicted
or convicted"); Breyer, supra note 18, at 10 (noting that real-offense sentencing
"bases punishment on the elements of the specific circumstances of the case").
The Federal Guidelines Manual provides the following example to contrast the two
approaches:
A bank robber, for example, might have used a gun, frightened bystand-
ers, taken $50,000, injured a teller, refused to stop when ordered, and
raced away damaging property during his escape. A pure real offense
system would sentence on the basis of all identifiable conduct. A pure
charge offense system would overlook some of the harms that did not
constitute statutory elements of the offenses of which the defendant was
convicted.
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A, intro. cmt. 4 (1998). The Com-
mission initially set out to develop a pure real offense system, noting that the pre-
guidelines system was, in a sense, this type of system. See id. (stating that sentenc-
ing court and parole commission examined defendants' conduct prior to guide-
lines). The sentencing court and the Commission took account of a defendant's
actions as described in a pre-sentence report. See id. (noting that defendant's con-
duct was determined by sentencing hearing or parole commission officer). The
Commission, however, found no practical way to provide for the myriad types of
diverse harms arising in different circumstances. See id. (noting that such system
risked return to wide sentencing disparities). The Commission also could not de-
vise a practical way to "reconcile the need for a fair adjudicatory procedure with
the need for a speedy sentencing process given the potential existence of hosts of
adjudicated 'real harm' facts in many typical cases." Id. The Commission eventu-
ally moved toward a charge system that takes into account "a significant number of
real offense elements ... such as role in the offense, the presence of a gun, or the
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ness and the administrative workability of such methods became one of
the key compromises of the Federal Guidelines.
12 2
The end result is a guideline system that accomplishes a compromise
between pure charge-offense and pure real-offense ideologies-that is, a
amount of money taken, through alternative base offense levels, specific offense
characteristics, cross references and adjustments." Id.
122. See FED. R. CilM. P. 32(c) (governing sentencing hearing). Rule
32(c) (1) provides the defendant an opportunity to examine and comment on the
probation officer's findings:
(1) Sentencing Hearing. At the sentencing hearing, the court must af-
ford counsel for the defendant and for the Government an opportunity
to comment on the probation officer's determinations and on other mat-
ters relating to the appropriate sentence, and must rule on any un-
resolved objections to the presentence report. The court may, in its
discretion, permit the parties to introduce testimony or other evidence
on the objections. For each matter controverted, the court must make
either a finding on the allegation or a determination that no finding is
necessary because the controverted matter will not be taken into account
in, or will not affect, sentencing. A written record of these findings and
determinations must be appended to any copy of the presentence report
made available to the Bureau of Prisons.
Id. Rule 32 allows a defendant access to a procedure to contest the findings upon
which his or her sentence will be determined. See id. (allowing procedure); see also
United States v. O'Neill, 767 F.2d 780, 787 (11th Cir. 1985) (vacating sentence and
remanding for resentencing for failure of court to make findings pursuant to Rule
32 as to each controverted pre-sentence report item or to determine that no such
finding was necessary); United States v. Pettito, 767 F.2d 607, 609 (9th Cir. 1985)
(stating that purpose of Rule 32 is to ensure that record is made of "exactly what
resolution occurred as to the controverted matter," ensuring accuracy of record to
be used for sentencing).
Some commentators claim, however, that the federal sentencing process al-
lows offenders to be sentenced to untried and unproven crimes through this pro-
cess. See, e.g., Bennett L. Gershman, The New Prosecutors, 53 U. Prrr. L. REv. 393,
420 (1992) (noting lesser procedural safeguards and evidentiary standards of sen-
tencing hearings). The lesser procedural protections and lower evidentiary stan-
dards of sentencing hearings provide a temptation for prosecutors to withhold
proof of some crimes until sentencing, thereby gaining a harsher sentence via evi-
dence that probably would not have proven at trial. See id. (noting temptation of
prosecutors to withhold introduction of certain crimes until sentencing hearings).
For example, the prosecutor in United States v. Kikumura withheld evidence until
the time of sentencing. See United States v. Kikumura, 918 F.2d 1084, 1089 (3d
Cir. 1990) (stating that prosecutor withheld evidence of other crimes until time of
sentencing). The defendant was convicted of several passport and weapons of-
fenses for which the Federal Guidelines prescribe a sentencing range of 27 to 33
months. See id. at 1089. The prosecutor introduced proof at the sentencing hear-
ing that the defendant manufactured lethal home-made firebombs in preparation
for a major terrorist bombing. See id. (noting that prosecutor did not introduce
bomb evidence until time of sentencing). Based on this bomb manufacturing
charge, for which the defendant was neither tried nor convicted, the district court
judge imposed a sentence of 30 years imprisonment. See id. In a concurring opin-
ion, Judge Rosenn expressed his concern that "the Government's manipulation of
Kikumura's charge and sentencing illustrates the problem reported by many
courts that the sentencing guidelines have replaced judicial discretion over sen-
tencing with prosecutorial discretion. In so doing, it may have violated Kikumura's
tight to due process." Id. at 1119 (Rosenn, J., concurring).
[Vol. 45: p. 793
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charge-offense system with some real elements, but not too many as to
make it unwieldy or procedurally unfair.
12 3
123. See Breyer, supra note 18, at 12 (describing Commission's final creation
as compromise between charge-offense and real-offense ideologies). The system
starts out like a charge-offense system, with the sentencing court looking to the
offense charged to secure a base offense. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL
§ 1B1.1 (1998) (providing application instructions). The U.S. Sentencing Guide-
lines Manual instructs the sentencing court first to "[d] etermine the base offense
level." Id. The Guidelines then modify that charge-offense level in light of several
real-offense aggravating or mitigating circumstances for each specific crime. See id.
(directing court, after determining base offense level, to "apply any appropriate
specific offense characteristics, cross references, and special instructions contained
in the particular guideline in Chapter Two . . . "). The federal guidelines make
reference to aggravating and mitigating circumstances throughout. See, e.g., id.
§ 2B3.1 (b) (1)-(7) (providing aggravating and mitigating factors for offense of rob-
bery). For example, to adjust upward for the presence of a firearm in the commis-
sion of robbery, section 2B3.1 (b) (2) provides:
(A) If a firearm was discharged, increase by 7 levels; (B) if a firearm was
otherwise used, increase by 6 levels; (C) if a firearm was brandished, dis-
played, or possessed, increase by 5 levels; (D) if a dangerous weapon was
otherwise used, increase by 4 levels; (E) if a dangerous weapon was bran-
dished, displayed, or possessed, increase by 3 levels; or (F) if a threat of
death was made, increase by 2 levels.
Id. § 2B3.1 (b) (2). General adjustments are then made according to such circum-
stances as victim characteristics and the defendant's role in the offense. See id.
§ 3A-B (discussing victim characteristics and defendant's role in crime). For exam-
ple, section 3A.1 (a) provides an adjustment for hate crime motivation:
If the finder of fact at trial or, in the case of a plea of guilty or nolo
contendere, the court at sentencing determines beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant intentionally selected any victim or any prop-
erty as the object of the offense of conviction because of the actual or
perceived race, color, religion, national origin, ethnicity, gender, disabil-
ity, or sexual orientation of any person, increase by 3 levels.
Id. § 3A1.1(a). Finally, characteristics of the offender are taken into account in
section 4, with section 4A accounting for criminal history of the offender, and
section 4B accounting for special "career offender" circumstances. See id. § 4A-B
(proving for offender characteristics). For example, section 4A1.1 provides for a
general criminal history calculation:
The total points from items (a) through (f) determine the criminal his-
tory category in the Sentencing Table in Chapter Five, Part A.
(a) Add 3 points for each prior sentence of imprisonment exceeding one
year and one month.
(b) Add 2 points for each prior sentence of imprisonment or at least
sixty days not counted in (a).
(c) Add 1 point for each prior sentence not counted in (a) or (b), up to
a total of 4 points for this item.
(d) Add 2 points if the defendant committed the instant offense while
under any criminal justice sentence, including probation, parole, su-
pervised release, imprisonment, work release, or escape status.
(e) Add 2 points if the defendant committed the instant offense less than
two years after release from imprisonment on a sentence counted
under (a) or (b) or while in imprisonment or escape status on such a
sentence. If 2 points are added for item (d), add only 1 point for this
item.
(f) Add 1 point for each prior sentence resulting from a conviction of a
crime of violence that did not receive any points under (a), (b) or (c)
2000] COMMENT 815
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The Commission recognized and allowed for the fact that prosecutors
could manipulate a charge-offense system by increasing or decreasing the
number of counts in an indictment by structuring the Federal Guidelines
accordingly.124
4. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and White Collar Crime
In the mid- to late 1980s, the public began to perceive a leniency in
sentencing toward white collar offenders, and courts began to reflect this
sentiment in their sentencing practices. 125 In its study of sentencing prac-
above because such sentence was considered related to another sen-
tence resulting from a conviction of a crime of violence, up to a total
of 3 points for this item. Provided, that this item does not apply where
the sentences are considered related because the offenses occurred
on the same occasion.
Id. § 4A1.1. Finally, the federal guidelines provide for "departures," which allow
the sentencing court to depart from a guideline sentence when, and only when,
the court finds "an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a de-
gree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in
formulating the guidelines that should result in a sentence different from that
described." Id. at 6 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(B) (1984)).
Of course, there are those who believe the Federal Guidelines contain too
many real-offense adjustments. See, e.g., Breyer, supra note 18, at 12 (quoting Asso-
ciate Attorney General Stephen S. Trott as saying that "the definition of conduct
that is relevant to sentencing... [should be] enlarged to include any conduct that is
related to the offense of conviction, even if it is not ... in furtherance of that offense
and any harms resulting from that conduct...." (emphasis added)). Other com-
mentators believe that the Federal Guidelines contain too few real-offense adjust-
ments. See id. at 50 n.75 (noting that testimony of Dr. Edward J. Burger, Jr.,
Council of Court Excellence, suggests that elements such as offender characteris-
tics promote unnecessary sentencing disparity).
124. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 5-6 (1998) (noting that Com-
mission took into account possibility of prosecutors influencing sentences by in-
creasing or decreasing counts). Generally, the Federal Guidelines provide that
when conduct involves fungible items, like separate drug transactions or thefts of
money, the amounts are added and the Guidelines apply to the total amount. See
id. at 8 (discussing application of Federal Guidelines). When conduct involves
nonfungible harms, "the offense level for the most serious count is increased (ac-
cording to a diminishing scale) to reflect the existence of other counts of convic-
tion." Id. at 9. For example, the Federal Guidelines would treat a three-count
indictment, each count being 100 grams of heroin or theft of $10,000, the same as
one count of 300 grams of heroin or theft of $30,000. See id. at 6 (providing exam-
ple). Also, the court can control inappropriate manipulation with its departure
power. See id. (noting departure power of court). For a discussion of a federal
sentencing court's departure power, see supra notes 104-11 and accompanying
text.
125. See Feinstein et al., supra note 18, at 1094-95 (noting public perception of
leniency toward white collar offenders). In the mid-1980s, courts began to address
this public sentiment by imposing increasingly harsh sentences on white collar of-
fenders. See id. (discussing increasingly harsh sentencing of white collar offend-
ers); see also United States v. Marquardt, 786 F.2d 771, 774 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding
that seven concurrent three-year terms of imprisonment for embezzlement from
savings and loan was not abuse of discretion); United States v. Morse, 785 F.2d 771,
774 (9th Cir. 1986) (imposing sentences of four and seven years imprisonment,
respectively, on two defendants for mail fraud and securities fraud resulting from
[Vol. 45: p. 793
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tices prior to the passage of the Federal Guidelines, the Commission
found that there were significant discrepancies between punishment of
white collar crimes, such as fraud and embezzlement, and similar but
more "common" theft crimes such as larceny. 126 As a result, rectifying the
perceived leniency toward white collar offenders became a policy objec-
tive, and the Commission crafted the Federal Guidelines accordingly.
1 27
The Commission rectified the situation by providing for short but cer-
tain terms of confinement for many types of economic crimes that, prior
to the Federal Guidelines, likely would have resulted in only probation.
128
tax shelter/investment scheme); United States v. Lamp, 779 F.2d 1088, 1098 (5th
Cir. 1986) (holding that twelve year sentence for tax evasion, conspiracy to defraud
IRS and aiding and abetting perjury was not excessive). The sentencing judge in
Marquardt noted that although this was not a crime of violence, he was concerned
by "the calculated nature of [the] offense," and with promoting general deter-
rence because "[this [was] not the only savings and loan embezzlement that's
been through court lately." Marquardt, 786 F.2d at 781-82.
126. See Breyer, supra note 18, at 20 (noting disparity between white collar
crime sentencing and non-white collar crime sentencing). The Commission found
that courts granted probation more frequently to white collar offenders than of-
fenders convicted of other crimes, and that white collar offenders received less
severe prison terms when sentenced to incarceration. See id. (discussing differ-
ences between sentences courts typically impose on white collar offenders and
those convicted of other crimes).
127. See Feinstein et al., supra note 18, at 1095 (noting that severity of white
collar crime became policy issue, "and that such offenses were specifically singled
out by the Commission as targets for stiffer and more uniform sentences"). The
Commission noted that " [u] nder pre-guidelines sentencing practice, courts sen-
tenced to probation an inappropriately high percentage of offenders guilty of cer-
tain economic crimes, such as theft, tax evasion, antitrust offenses, insider trading,
fraud, and embezzlement .. " U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A
(1998). These crimes, in the Commission's view, are "serious." See id. (noting that
certain economic crimes are serious); see also Feinstein et al., supra note 18, at 1095
n.118 (noting Commission's findings regarding pre-guidelines sentencing prac-
tice). Commission member Judge Breyer noted that "white collar criminals, who
now tend always to receive probation, [should] receive some short prison term-
antitrust, insider trading, embezzlement, fraud-those people, in fairness, ought
to be treated the same way as other people who are engaged in theft or crimes that
are really functionally similar." Id. (citations omitted).
128. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A (1998) (noting that
Commission's solution was to "write guidelines that classify as serious many of-
fenses for which probation previously was frequently given and provide for at least
a short period of imprisonment in such cases"); Breyer, supra note 18, at 20-21
(noting decision of Commission to require short but certain terms of confinement
for many white collar offenders). Before the Federal Guidelines, a federal sentenc-
ing judge could sentence all offenders convicted of embezzlement, tax evasion or
antitrust violations to probation with no confinement whatsoever. See Breyer, supra
note 18, at 22 (stating that "deterrence approach is heavy factor in sentencing
white collar or economic offenders"). The Commission, however, fashioned the
Federal Guidelines to prescribe imprisonment for all but the most minor of white
collar offenses. See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5, pt. A (1998)
(providing sentencing grid which prescribes imprisonment for offenders convicted
of crimes of offense level one or higher). For example, the base offense level for
fraud, $2,000 or less, is six. See id. § 2F1.1 (b) (1) (A) (providing base offense levels
for offenses involving fraud or deceit). Applying this base offense level of six to
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The Commission's goal in crafting the Federal Guidelines for white collar
sentencing was not only to remedy pre-guideline sentencing disparities,
but also to "serve as a significant deterrent, particularly when compared
with pre-guidelines practice where probation, not prison, was the
norm."129 As a result, the Federal Guidelines now take a relatively harsh
stance toward white collar and economic crime. 1
30
5. The Pennsylvania Sentencing Guidelines
In 1978, the Pennsylvania General Assembly passed legislation that
created the Pennsylvania Sentencing Commission ("Pennsylvania Commis-
the grid in chapter five yields imprisonment of zero to six months. See id. at ch. 5,
pt. A (stating that applying base offense level of six to grid results in zero to six
months imprisonment). For a first-time offender, offense levels through eight
comprise Zone A, the only zone which has zero as its minimum confinement time.
See id. (discussing composition of Zone A). Fraud of more than $10,000 results in
an offense level of nine, which, when applied to the sentencing grid, results in four
to ten months imprisonment. See id. § 2FI.I (b) (1) (D). Probation may be pre-
scribed for the entire Zone A range (offense levels one through eight for first-time
offender) of the sentencing grid. See id. (discussing probation for first-time offend-
ers). For Zone B offenses, probation may be prescribed only if the court imposes
"a condition or combination of conditions requiring intermittent confinement,
community confinement, or home detention as provided in subsection (c) (3) of
§ 5C1.1." Id. § 5B1.1. Subsection (c) of the Guidelines Manual provides:
(c) If the applicable guideline range is in Zone B of the Sentencing Ta-
ble, the minimum term may be satisfied by-
(1) a sentence of imprisonment; or
(2) a sentence of imprisonment that includes a term of supervised
release with a condition that substitutes community confinement
or home detention according to the schedule in subsection (e),
provided that at least one month is satisfied by imprisonment; or
(3) a sentence of probation that includes a condition or combina-
tion of conditions that substitute intermittent confinement, com-
munity confinement, or home detention for imprisonment
according to the schedule in subsection (e).
Id. § 5C1.1(c). Part (f) provides that "[i]f the applicable guideline range is in
Zone D of the Sentencing Table, the minimum term shall be satisfied by a sen-
tence of imprisonment." Id. § 5C1.1(f). Thus, for fraud of over $120,000, which
calculates to offense level 13, the term of imprisonment is 12-18 months. See id.
§ 2F1.1 (b) (1) (H).
129. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A, cmt. 4(d) (1998). The
Commission solved the "philosophical problem" by using an empirical/historical
approach. See id. at cmt. 3(d) (outlining differing philosophical approaches to
sentencing, and empirical/historical compromise). The "deterrence approach,"
however, weighs more heavily in the sentencing of white collar or economic of-
fenders who, in the Commission's view, were penalized too lightly before the Fed-
eral Guidelines. See id. at cmt. 4(d) (noting that "the definite prospect of prison,
even though the term may be short, will serve as a significant deterrent, particu-
larly when compared with pre-guidelines practice").
130. See Breyer, supra note 18, at 21-23 (discussing stance of Federal Guide-
lines towards white collar crime); Feinstein et al., supra note 18, at 1095 (same);
Murphy, supra note 13, at 14 (noting that in light of direction from Congress to
stiffen sentences for white collar crime, Sentencing Commission "took this ball and
ran with it").
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sion") to address disparity and leniency in sentencing.' 3' In this legisla-
tion, the Pennsylvania General Assembly charged the Pennsylvania
Commission with developing sentencing guidelines that would promote
fairness and reduce disparity by giving judges a common reference point
from which to sentence offenders who had similar backgrounds and had
committed similar crimes. 13 2 The Pennsylvania Commission is composed
of two members of the Pennsylvania House of Representatives, two mem-
bers of the Pennsylvania Senate, four judges and three Governor appoin-
tees. 13 3  To promulgate guidelines, the Commission publishes its
proposed guidelines in the Pennsylvania Bulletin, holds hearings between
thirty and sixty days after publication, then evaluates public comment, re-
vises and publishes the revised version.' 34 If the Pennsylvania General As-
sembly does not reject the published revised guideline proposals by
concurrent resolution ninety days after publication, the guidelines be-
come effective immediately thereafter. 35
The Pennsylvania Guidelines are composed of the standard matrix,
with gravity of offense ("offense gravity score") comprising the vertical
axis, and offender history ("prior record score") comprising the horizon-
tal axis.136 Once a defendant's offense gravity score and prior record
score are determined, the intersection of these two values on the matrix
provides the judge with a standard range, given in months, in which to
sentence the defendant.' 37 Any range that has a first value of "RS," such
as RS-3, means that the court has the option of imposing Restorative Sanc-
tions (restitution) with no confinement; RS-3 denotes a range of confine-
ment of zero to three months combined with the payment of
restitution. 138 If the pinpointed cell is in a shaded portion of the matrix,
the court has the option of imposing "Restrictive Intermediate Punish-
ment" ("RIP").' 3 9 RIP is defined as a "program that provide[s] for strict
supervision of the offender" by housing the offender full time or part
time, significantly monitoring and restricting the offender's movement
131. See 1978 Pa. Laws 319 (creating Pennsylvania Sentencing Commission).
132. See id. § 1384 (requiring Commission to adopt sentencing guidelines to
effect purposes of statute).
133. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2152(a) (1998) (setting forth composition of
Commission).
134. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2155 (setting forth promulgation process).
135. See § 2155(b)-(c) (providing for automatic effectiveness in 90 days if not
rejected in entirety by concurrent resolution).
136. See 204 PA. CODE § 303.16 (1994) (providing basic sentencing matrix).
137. See § 303.2 (providing procedure for determining guideline sentence).
138. See § 303.12(a) (5) (defining restorative sanctions). The Pennsylvania
Code elaborates on restorative sanctions by stating that they are the least restrictive
in terms of constraining the offender's liberties because the sanctions do not in-
volve the housing of the offender (either full or part time) and focus on restoring
the victim to pre-offense status. See id. (discussing restrictiveness of restorative
sanctions).
139. See § 303.12(a) (1) (ii) (denoting shaded areas on sentencing matrix as
areas where Restrictive Intermediate Punishment ("RIP") may be imposed).
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and compliance with the program, or a combination of these methods of
supervision. 14
0
The standard range can deviate via a deadly weapon enhancement, a
youth/school enhancement, or an aggravator or mitigator, with the devia-
tions spelled out in months, plus or minus, for various groupings of of-
fense gravity scores.141 As a result, each cell of the matrix has a standard
range, a mitigated range and an aggravated range. 142 Deadly weapon en-
hancements have their own matrices: one matrix for "deadly weapon pos-
sessed" and one matrix for "deadly weapon used. 1 4 3 When a court
departs from the Pennsylvania Guidelines such that a sentence is either
longer than provided for in the aggravated range, or shorter than pro-
vided for in the mitigated range, the court must state on the record that
the sentence is a departure. 14 4
140. See § 303.12(a) (4) (i) (describing RIP). The Pennsylvania Code elabo-
rates on the types of sanctions that can be imposed as intermediate punishment:
(a) A program may be either residential or nonresidential and either




(3) House arrest combined with electronic monitoring.
(4) Probation with daily reporting.
(5) Intensive supervision.
(6) Full-time participation in a community public works project.
(7) Full- or part-time participation in a public or private community
service project.
(8) Housing in a community residential treatment or residential re-
habilitative center ....
(c) In addition to the elements set forth in subsections (a) and (b), a
Program may be comprised of:
(1) An inpatient drug and alcohol program based on objective as-
sessment that an offender is dependent on alcohol or drugs.
(2) Residential rehabilitative center services.
(3) Individualized treatment services.
37 PA. CODE § 451.51 (1991).
141. See 204 PA. CODE. § 303.10(a) (1994) (providing sentence enhancement
if defendant used deadly weapon); § 303.10(b) (providing sentence enhancement
if defendant either distributed controlled substance to person under 18 or manu-
factured, delivered or possessed with intent to deliver controlled substance within
1,000 feet of school); § 303.13 (providing enhancement if aggravating or mitigat-
ing circumstance is present). When ajudge imposes an aggravated or mitigated
sentence, he or she must state the reasons on the record. See § 303.13(c) (requir-
ing that record reflects reasons for aggravated or mitigated sentence).
142. See § 303.13(a)(1)-(4) (describing ranges for different offense gravity
levels).
143. See § 303.17 (providing matrix if deadly weapon possessed in crime);
§ 303.18 (providing matrix if deadly weapon used in crime).
144. See PA SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 2, at 53 (providing description
of 204 PA. CODE § 303.1(d)). The manual states that "[i]n every case where the
court imposes a sentence outside the sentencing guidelines, the court shall pro-
vide a contemporaneous written statement of the reason or reasons for the devia-
tion from the guidelines." Id. (citing 204 PA. CODE § 303.1(d)).
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Notwithstanding the statutory requirement that sentencing judges
must state on the record the reason or reasons for departure, the actual
binding force of the Pennsylvania Guidelines is unclear because the stat-
ute requires only that courts "consider" the guidelines when sentencing a
defendant. 1 45 The advisory nature of the Pennsylvania statute was con-
firmed by Commonwealth v. Sessoms,1 4 6 which held that "the legislature has
done no more than direct that the courts take notice of the Commission's
work," because the Pennsylvania Guidelines "cannot, without more, be
given the effect of law, either as legislation or regulation, so as to by them-
selves alter the legal rights and duties of the defendant, the prosecutor,
and the sentencing court."1 47
III. ANALYSIS
A. Comparing Sentencing Guidelines: Pennsylvania and Federal Sentencing
Guidelines' Treatment of White Collar Crime
Unlike the Federal Guidelines, the Pennsylvania Guidelines were not
formulated with an emphasis on being stern towards white collar and eco-
nomic crime.148 The Pennsylvania Guidelines, by contrast, were formu-
lated in the 1970s when proportionality to crime seriousness and offender
history were the primary concerns of the legislature, and white collar
crime had not yet reached its media-fueled notoriety. 149
Comparisons between federal and Pennsylvania sentencing demon-
strates the different stances each system takes towards white collar offend-
ers. For example, under the Federal Guidelines, a federal first-time
offender convicted of theft or embezzlement of $15,000 would have zero
criminal history points and an offense level of nine. 1 50 Barring any adjust-
ments, applying this factor to the sentencing matrix results in four to ten
months confinement. 15 ' Performing the same exercise under the Penn-
sylvania Guidelines yields a somewhat different result. A comparable
145. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9721(b) (West 1998) (mandating trial
court to "consider any guidelines for sentencing adopted by the Pennsylvania Com-
mission on Sentencing" (emphasis added)).
146. 532 A.2d 775 (Pa. 1987).
147. Id. at 780-81. The Sessoms court relegated the statute to advisory status on
constitutional separation of powers grounds, as the statute contained no present-
ment provision that mandated that a rejection resolution be presented to the Gov-
ernor before taking effect. See id. at 783 (relegating statute to advisory status on
separation of power grounds).
148. See, e.g., Feinstein et al., supra note 18, at 1094-95 (noting particularly
harsh stance of Federal Guidelines towards white collar crime, with purpose being
deterrence and retribution).
149. See 1978 Pa. Laws 319 (creating Pennsylvania Sentencing Commission
with purpose of proportionality and retribution).
150. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1 (b) (1) (F) (1998) (pro-
viding offense level for "Larceny, Embezzlement, and Other Forms of Theft: Re-
ceiving, Transporting, Transferring, Transmitting, or Possessing Stolen Property").
151. See id. at ch. 5, pt. A (providing sentencing matrix).
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Pennsylvania crime entitled "Theft by Deception" yields the following sen-
tence for a similar offender: again, the prior record score is zero because
the offender is a first-time offender; the offense gravity score for theft by
deception of an amount between $2,000 to $25,000, is five. 15 2 Applying
this value to the sentencing matrix yields a standard range of "RS-9," which
requires restitution or zero to nine months confinement. 15 3 Assuming a
similar white collar crime and similar offender, involving no aggravating
or mitigating circumstances, the Federal Guidelines mandate four to ten
months of confinement, while the Pennsylvania Guidelines only "suggest"
zero to nine of months confinement. 154
A more striking example is a comparison between the Federal Guide-
lines and the Pennsylvania Guidelines for the offense of fraud, arguably a
more "white-collar" crime than theft by deception, because the perpetra-
tor is typically an individual in a position of trust. 1 55 Under the Federal
Guidelines, a first-time offender who defrauded a victim out of $250,000
would have an offense level of fourteen, landing him or her in the fifteen
to twenty-one months incarceration cell.' 5 6 In a Pennsylvania state court,
however, this same person, sentenced for "Deceptive or Fraudulent Busi-
ness Practices over $2,000," would have an offense gravity score of only
five, again landing the offender in the standard range of "RS-9" or zero to
nine months confinement.' 5 7 It is here that a glaring difference between
the Pennsylvania and Federal Sentencing Guidelines becomes apparent-
152. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3922 (1998) (describing crime of theft by decep-
tion); 204 PA. CODE § 303.15 (1994) (listing offense gravity score by offense).
153. See 204 PA. CODE § 303.16 (1994) (providing basic sentencing matrix).
154. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, ch. 5, pt. A (1998) (providing
that offender would fall in range of four to ten months confinement); 204 PA.
CODE § 303.16 (suggesting that offender receive zero to nine months confine-
ment). For a discussion of the differences between the Federal and Pennsylvania
Sentencing Guidelines regarding white collar offenders, see infra notes 150-64 and
accompanying text.
155. See M.I. Dixon, The Re-Defining of White Collar Crime, 13 DICK. J. INT'L L.
561, 561 (1995) (suggesting white collar crime includes all financial crime, such as
theft by deception and tax evasion, rather than just "occupational" crime). The
traditional definition of white collar crime, as E.H. Sutherland coined the term in
1940, is a "'crime committed by a person of respectability and high social status in
the course of his occupation.'" Id. at 562 (quoting E.H. Sutherland, White Collar
Criminality, 5 AM. Soc. REv. 1 (1940)).
In general, the Federal Guidelines differentiate between fraud and theft in
that the two have different offense level schedules. Compare U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2F1.1 (1998) (providing sentencing schedule for "Fraud
and Deceit; Forgery; Offenses Involving Altered or Counterfeit Instruments Other
than Counterfeit Bearer Obligations of the United States"), with § 2Bl.1 (provid-
ing offense level for "Larceny, Embezzlement, and Other Forms of Theft; Receiv-
ing, Transporting, Transferring, Transmitting, or Possessing Stolen Property").
156. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2F1.1 (1998) (providing sen-
tencing schedule for "Fraud and Deceit; Forgery; Offenses Involving Altered or
Counterfeit Instruments Other than Counterfeit Bearer Obligations of the United
States").
157. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4107(a.1) (1) (I) (2000) (indicating that felony
of $2,000 or more is considered "third degree" or "F3"); 204 PA. CODE § 303.15
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the federal offender will face a minimum fifteen months confinement,
while the Pennsylvania offender may face no confinement at all.
B. Rationales
Why the difference? The most obvious difference between the two
guideline systems is that the Federal Guidelines are mandatory, and the
Pennsylvania Guidelines are "mere suggestions."' 58 But even if the Penn-
sylvania Guidelines imposed a mandatory sentence, the differences in the
range of incarceration time between the two-the difference between go-
ing to jail and not going to jail-is monumental in the eyes of the of-
fender.159 Because certain imprisonment is seen as a strong deterrent
against white collar crime, and Pennsylvania generally does not impose
mandatory imprisonment for typical white collar offenses, one may
surmise that potential white collar offenders are not significantly deterred
in Pennsylvania.
Another difference is that the Federal Guidelines were proposed and
enacted in the late 1980s, a time when white collar crime-big money
white collar crime-gained significant notoriety in the media.160 The Fed-
eral Guidelines, at their inception, took a harsh stance toward white collar
offenders because they were a product of their era.161 The Pennsylvania
Guidelines, by contrast, were conceived in the 1970s, before white collar
crime gained significant notoriety.162 Consequently, no explicit anti-white
collar crime measures found their way into the Pennsylvania enabling
statute. 16
3
Finally, there is the issue of limited prison capacity. The federal gov-
ernment, many would argue, has much more money to spend on prisons
than the states. The states, which have to carefully divide space between
(listing offense gravity score by offense); 204 PA. CODE § 303.16 (displaying sen-
tencing range).
158. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1994) (mandating use of guidelines in federal
sentencing); Commonwealth v. Sessoms, 532 A.2d 775, 781 (Pa. 1987) (noting that
Pennsylvania Guidelines need only be considered).
159. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A (noting deterrent
effect of certain imprisonment). The Commission found that pre-guideline sen-
tencing of economic crime offenders resulted in a disproportionate amount of
probation, and that "the definite prospect of prison, even though the term may be
short, will serve as a significant deterrent" to economic crime offenders. Id.
160. See Elkan Abramowitz, From Wrist Slaps to Hard Time, N.Y.L.J.,Jan. 8, 1991,
at 3 (discussing Michael Milken's sentence of 10 years imprisonment and $600
million in fines and restitution for fraud and general stiffening of sentences of
white collar offenders).
161. See Feinstein et. al, supra note 18, at 1095 (noting view in 1987 that white
collar crime was "serious").
162. See 1978 Pa. Laws 319 (creating Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing
in 1978).
163. See generally id. (providing no measures to combat white collar crime).
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violent and nonviolent offenders, understandably make the sacrifice in
favor of housing violent offenders.' 64
IV. CONCLUSION
For white collar offenders, crime pays in Pennsylvania. For example,
Debra King, introduced in Part I of this Comment, would have received a
much harsher sentence under the Federal Guidelines, one that would
have included at least ten months imprisonment. 1 65 But this outcome
turns out to be a judgment made by state citizens through the political
process, that limited prison space is better allocated to violent offenders
than to non-violent offenders.
An argument one might make in opposition to harsh sentencing of
white collar offenders is that, compared to the federal government, which
has a virtually unlimited budget for prison building, Pennsylvania has
much more limited resources from which to build prisons. This argument
presupposes that prison resources are a finite "pie"; that is, in order to
house more white collar offenders, the state would have to house fewer
violent offenders. This argument has questionable merit, however, be-
cause prison population was not even considered in the formulation of the
Pennsylvania Guidelines.
1 66
What remains is an attitude among the judiciary, and perhaps some
elected district attorneys, that white collar offenders are not as "danger-
ous" as violent offenders. 16 7 "Dangerous" can be defined as immediate
physical danger, but it can also be defined in the aggregate sense, such as
the dramatic economic impact of the savings and loan scandal of the late
1980s and early 1990s. 16 8 Until the judiciary realizes that economic and
white collar crime imposes a huge and far reaching cost on society, poten-
tial offenders will not be significantly deterred. Perpetrators of economic
164. See, e.g., Bogan, supra note 71, at 469 (noting Oregon's sentencing com-
mission enabling statute included control of prison overpopulation as considera-
tion in constructing guidelines).
165. See U.S. SENTENCING GUILDLINES MANUAL § 2B1.1 (b) (1) (K) (1998) (as-
signing offense level of 14 for theft of more than $200,000); see also id. at ch. 5, pt.
A (imposing sentence of 15-21 months for offense level 14). Even with a two point
downward adjustment for "Acceptance of Responsibility," Debra King still would
have received 10-16 months imprisonment. See id. § 3El.1 (a) (imposing sentence
of 10-16 months for offense level 12).
166. See Marvell, supra note 42, at 699 (noting that Pennsylvania legislature
did not include prison capacity among criteria to be considered in formulation of
guidelines). Dr. Marvell stated that "[tlhe Pennsylvania legislature considered
such a provision, but decided not to include it, and the sentencing commission did
not factor in prison capacity." Id.
167. See Murphy, supra note 13, at 5 (noting that interviewed judges consid-
ered violent crimes to be "more serious, and more deserving of severe
punishment").
168. See id. at 14 (noting costs to society of savings and loan scandal).
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and white collar crimes will conduct business as usual'because they will
likely not be caught, not be prosecuted if caught, and leniently sentenced
if caught, prosecuted and found guilty.
Peter Fridirici
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